Tuesday, January 29, 2013

Thomas Paine on war, commerce, government, and paper money

Thomas Paine, born 276 years ago today in 1737, was a profoundly influential public figure and one of history’s most widely read authors.  John Adams is reputed to have said that without the pen of Paine, the sword of Washington would have been wielded in vain.  Yet Adams, like many others in the forefront of the political cataclysms of the late 18th century, loathed almost everything about Paine.  “The longer John Adams lived,” writes Harvard historian Jill LePore, “the more he hated Thomas Paine, and the more worthless he considered that seventy-seven-page pamphlet” Common Sense that sparked the American Revolution.

During the last years of Paine’s life, rabidly pro-British and firebrand journalist William Cobbett used his widely-read Porcupine’s Gazette to attack Paine on nearly every issue.  Quoting Cobbett in his biography of Paine, author Craig Nelson writes:
Whenever and wherever [Paine] breathes his last, he will excite neither sorrow nor compassion; no friendly hand will close his eyes, not a groan will be uttered, not a tear will be shed.  Like Judas he will be remembered by posterity; men will learn to express all that is base, malignant, treacherous, unnatural and blasphemous, by the single monosyllable, PAINE. [p. 5]
Cobbett had sized up the public’s contempt quite accurately.  After the Quakers had denied Paine his wish to be buried in their cemetery, Paine, who died on the morning of June 8, 1809, was interred on his farm in New Rochelle, NY.   His close friend Marguerite Bonneville recounted the burial:
The interment was a scene to affect and to wound any sensible heart.  Contemplating who it was, what man it was, that we were committing to an obscure grave on an open and disregarded bit of land, I could not help feeling most acutely. . .  Looking round me, and beholding a small group of spectators, I exclaimed, as the earth was tumbled into the grave, “Oh! Mr. Paine!  My son stands here as testimony of the gratitude of America, and I, for France!” [p. 324]
As I wrote in an earlier essay, “The man who inspired the country to secede from a corrupt state had six people in attendance at his funeral, none of whom were dignitaries.”

Yet, amazingly, after Paine’s death Cobbett underwent a radical conversion.  Of all the issues on which he had to concede Paine was right, perhaps none affected him more than Paine’s essay, The Decline and Fall of the English System of Finance, in which the author predicted the Bank of England would fail from “Britain’s never-ending warmongering” and “her escalating national debt, crushing taxes, and overreliance on paper money.” [p. 4]  Aided by Marguerite Bonneville, Cobbett wrote “a definitive Paine biography, doing penance for having been the American publisher of Francis Oldys’s The Life of Thomas Paine, a slanderous attack subsidized by the British government.” [p. 6]

Paine was a polemicist of the highest order who held strong convictions.  He wrote in language that was easily understood by anyone, which because of his radical views often made him subject to the charge of rousing the rabble.  He attacked monarchy and believed the path to peace and prosperity was found in democratic republics.  He did not anticipate the breakdown of “free states” into functional authoritarianism that developed and accelerated in the early 20th century and continues unabated to this day.  So, for example, when he writes: “Government on the old system is an assumption of power, for the aggrandizement of itself,” he was referring to monarchies, but we can apply that observation to any government of today.

In celebration of his birthday, I have collected a few of his insights into war, commerce, government, and paper money.  All italics are in the original.

From the writings of Thomas Paine . . .

On this question of war, three things are to be considered. First, the right of declaring it: Secondly, the expense of supporting it: Thirdly, the mode of conducting it after it is declared. The French Constitution places the right where the expense must fall, and this union can be only in the nation [the people]. The mode of conducting it after it is declared, it consigns to the executive department. Were this the case in all countries, we should hear but little more of wars. - Rights of Man, The Complete Writings of Thomas Paine, Volume 1, p. 285.


Whatever is the cause of taxes to a nation, becomes also the means of revenue to a government. Every war terminates with an addition of taxes, and consequently with an addition of revenue; and in any event of war, in the manner they are now commenced and concluded, the power and interest of governments are increased.

War, therefore, from its productiveness, as it easily furnishes the pretense of necessity for taxes and appointments to places and offices, becomes a principal part of the system of old governments; and to establish any mode to abolish war, however advantageous it might be to nations, would be to take from such government the most lucrative of its branches. The frivolous matters upon which war is made, show the disposition and avidity of governments to uphold the system of war, and betray the motives upon which they act. - ibid., pp. 342-343


Why are not republics plunged into war, but because the nature of their government does not admit of an interest distinct from that of the nation? Even Holland, though an ill-constructed republic, and with a commerce extending over the world, existed nearly a century without war: and the instant the form of government was changed in France, the republican principles of peace and domestic prosperity and economy arose with the new Government; and the same consequences would follow the same causes in other nations. - ibid., p. 343


If universal peace, civilization, and commerce, are ever to be the happy lot of man, it cannot be accomplished but by a revolution in the system of governments. All the monarchial governments are military.

War is their trade, plunder and revenue their objects. While such governments continue, peace has not the absolute security of a day. What is the history of all monarchical governments, but a disgustful picture of human wretchedness, and the accidental respite of a few years' repose? Wearied with war, and tired with human butchery, they sat down to rest, and called it peace. - Rights of Man II, ibid., pp. 355-356


Almost everything appertaining to the circumstances of a nation, has been absorbed and confounded under the general and mysterious word government. Though it avoids taking to its account the errors it commits, and the mischiefs it occasions, it fails not to arrogate to itself whatever has the appearance of prosperity. It robs industry of its honors, by pedantically making itself the cause of its effects; and purloins from the general character of man, the merits that appertain to him as a social being. - ibid., p. 356


Government on the old system is an assumption of power, for the aggrandizement of itself; on the new, a delegation of power, for the common benefit of society. The former supports itself by keeping up a system of war; the latter promotes a system of peace, as the true means of enriching a nation. The one encourages national prejudices; the other promotes universal society, as the means of universal commerce. The one measures its prosperity, by the quantity of revenue it extorts; the other proves its excellence, by the small quantity of taxes it requires. - ibid., p. 363


. . . it is nevertheless true, that a great portion of mankind in what are called civilized countries, are in a state of poverty and wretchedness, far below the condition of an Indian. I speak not of one country, but of all. It is so in England, it is so all over Europe. Let us inquire into the cause.

It lies not in any natural defect in the principles of civilization, but in preventing those principles having an universal operation; the consequence of which is a perpetual system of war and expense, that drains the country, and defeats the general felicity of which civilization is capable. - ibid., pp. 398-399


Commerce is no other than the traffic of two individuals, multiplied on a scale of numbers; and by the same rule that nature intended the intercourse of two, she intended that of all. For this purpose she has distributed the materials of manufacturers and commerce in various and distant parts of a nation and of the world; and as they cannot be procured by war so cheaply or so commodiously as by commerce, she has rendered the latter the means of extirpating the former. - ibid., p. 400


When in the last, as well as in the former wars, the commerce of England sunk, it was because the general quantity was lessened everywhere; and it now rises because commerce is in a rising state in every nation. If England, at this day, imports or exports more than at any former period, the nations with which she trades must necessarily do the same; her imports are their exports, and vice versa.

There can be no such thing as a nation flourishing alone in commerce; she can only participate; and the destruction of it in any part must necessarily affect all. When, therefore, governments are at war, the attack is made upon the common stock of commerce, and the consequence is the same as if each had attacked his own. - ibid., p. 401


It is not whether this or that party shall be in or out, or Whig or Tory, or high or low shall prevail; but whether man shall inherit his rights, and universal civilization take place? Whether the fruits of his labor shall be enjoyed by himself, or consumed by the profligacy of governments? Whether robbery shall be banished from courts, and wretchedness from countries? - ibid., p. 404


But as the principles of the present Revolution differed from those which preceded it, so likewise did the conduct of America both in government and war. Neither the foul finger of disgrace nor the bloody hand of vengeance has hitherto put a blot upon her fame. Her victories have received luster from a greatness of lenity; and her laws have been permitted to slumber, where they might justly be awakened to punish. War, so much the trade of the world, has here been only the business of necessity; and when the necessity shall cease, her very enemies must confess, that as she drew the sword in her just defense, she used it without cruelty, and sheathed it without revenge. - Letter to the Abbe Raynal, The Complete Writings of Thomas Paine, Volume 2, pp. 220-221


I shall enumerate some of the evils of paper money and conclude with offering means for preventing them.

One of the evils of paper money is, that it turns the whole country into stock jobbers. The precariousness of its value and the uncertainty of its fate continually operate, night and day, to produce this destructive effect. Having no real value in itself it depends for support upon accident, caprice and party, and as it is the interest of some to depreciate and of others to raise its value, there is a continual invention going on that destroys the morals of the country.

It was horrid to see, and hurtful to recollect, how loose the principles of justice were left, by means of the paper emissions during the war. The experience then had, should be a warning to any assembly how they venture to open such a dangerous door again.

As to the romantic, if not hypocritical, tale that a virtuous people need no gold and silver, and that paper will do as well, it requires no other contradiction than the experience we have seen. Though some well- meaning people may be inclined to view it in this light, it is certain that the sharper always talks this language.

There are a set of men who go about making purchases upon credit, and buying estates they have not wherewithal to pay for; and having done this, their next step is to fill the newspapers with paragraphs of the scarcity of money and the necessity of a paper emission, then to have a legal tender under the pretense of supporting its credit, and when out, to depreciate it as fast as they can, get a deal of it for a little price, and cheat their creditors; and this is the concise history of paper money schemes.

But why, since the universal custom of the world has established money as the most convenient medium of traffic and commerce, should paper be set up in preference to gold and silver? The productions of nature are surely as innocent as those of art; and in the case of money, are abundantly, if not infinitely, more so. The love of gold and silver may produce covetousness, but covetousness, when not connected with dishonesty, is not properly a vice. It is frugality run to an extreme. But the evils of paper money have no end. Its uncertain and fluctuating value is continually awakening or creating new schemes of deceit. Every principle of justice is put to the rack, and the bond of society dissolved: the suppression, therefore, of paper money might very properly have been put into the act for preventing vice and immorality.


The pretense for paper money has been, that there was not a sufficiency of gold and silver. This, so far from being a reason for paper emissions, is a reason against them.


As gold and silver are not the productions of North America, they are, therefore, articles of importation; and if we set up a paper manufactory of money it amounts, as far as it is able, to prevent the importation of hard money, or to send it out again as fast it comes in; and by following this practice we shall continually banish the specie, till we have none left, and be continually complaining of the grievance instead of remedying the cause.

Considering gold and silver as articles of importation, there will in time, unless we prevent it by paper emissions, be as much in the country as the occasions of it require, for the same reasons there are as much of other imported articles. But as every yard of cloth manufactured in the country occasions a yard the less to be imported, so it is by money, with this difference, that in the one case we manufacture the thing itself and in the other we do not. We have cloth for cloth, but we have only paper dollars for silver ones.

As to the assumed authority of any assembly in making paper money, or paper of any kind, a legal tender, or in other language, a compulsive payment, it is a most presumptuous attempt at arbitrary power. There can be no such power in a republican government: the people have no freedom, and property no security where this practice can be acted: and the committee who shall bring in a report for this purpose, or the member who moves for it, and he who seconds it merits impeachment, and sooner or later may expect it.

Of all the various sorts of base coin, paper money is the basest. It has the least intrinsic value of anything that can be put in the place of gold and silver. A hobnail or a piece of wampum far exceeds it. And there would be more propriety in making those articles a legal tender than to make paper so. . . .

The laws of a country ought to be the standard of equity, and calculated to impress on the minds of the people the moral as well as the legal obligations of reciprocal justice. But tender laws, of any kind, operate to destroy morality, and to dissolve, by the pretense of law, what ought to be the principle of law to support, reciprocal justice between man and man: and the punishment of a member who should move for such a law ought to be death. . . .

If anything had, or could have, a value equal to gold and silver, it would require no tender law: and if it had not that value it ought not to have such a law; and, therefore, all tender laws are tyrannical and unjust, and calculated to support fraud and oppression.

Most of the advocates for tender laws are those who have debts to discharge, and who take refuge in such a law, to violate their contracts and cheat their creditors. But as no law can warrant the doing an unlawful act, therefore the proper mode of proceeding, should any such laws be enacted in future, will be to impeach and execute the members who moved for and seconded such a bill, and put the debtor and the creditor in the same situation they were in, with respect to each other, before such a law was passed. Men ought to be made to tremble at the idea of such a bare-faced act of injustice. It is in vain to talk of restoring credit, or complain that money cannot be borrowed at legal interest, until every idea of tender laws is totally and publicly reprobated and extirpated from among us. - Dissertations on Government, ibid., pp. 406-409























Wednesday, January 16, 2013

In counterfeiting we trust

If there is one central myth supporting the folly that passes for monetary policy and by extension fiscal policy, it would have to be the unchallenged assumption that money should be defined and controlled by government.  Given the role of money in the economy - that it is one-half of virtually every transaction - nothing has been more destructive to the well-being of most people than the government’s usurpation of money from the market.

Money was once the most marketable commodity (Ludwig von Mises, 1912).  Today, money is whatever the government says it is, and since 1933 in the U.S. it has been pieces of paper or their digital substitutes issued by the central bank and its members, the commercial banks. 

What’s wrong with having the government or its agent, the central bank, define money and regulate its supply, which in practice means regulating the rate at which the supply is increased?

First, the money is not theirs - it doesn’t belong to the government or the central bank.  Banks legitimately get their funds from depositors or investors.  Anything they create on their own through fractional-reserve lending is fraudulent, because they’re guaranteeing the same dollar to both a borrower and a depositor.  Government gets its revenue through the threat of violence and cannot rightfully claim ownership of any of it.

Property rights violations notwithstanding, why is this a harmful arrangement economically?  Because the government-supported banking system is a counterfeiting racket.  The act of counterfeiting money consists of duplicating the legal tender or standard currency and passing it off as legitimate.  The process allows the counterfeiter to default undetected on his end of the trade when he spends it because his money does not represent goods or services produced.  The subsequent increase in the supply of money puts downward pressure on the purchasing power of the monetary unit, so that holders of previously existing money are in effect paying for the counterfeiter’s purchases. 

Murray Rothbard discusses the counterfeiting process in his book, The Mystery of Banking. 
Counterfeiting, and the resulting inflation [of the money supply], is therefore a process by which some people—the early holders of the new money—benefit at the expense of (i.e. they expropriate) the late receivers. The first, earliest and largest net gainers are, of course, the counterfeiters themselves. . . .

Government is supposed to apprehend counterfeiters and duly break up and punish their operations. But what if government itself turns counterfeiter? In that case, there is no hope of combatting this activity by inventing superior detection devices.  pp. 36-37
Kings of old could debase their coins and pass them off as the real thing but this was a slow, tedious process that didn’t yield much revenue.  Not only that, people grew wise to it and found ways to tell a cheat from a genuine article.  And they saw it as a cheat, not as a way of increasing GDP, or making the price of exports more competitive, or stabilizing the price level.

Paper money changed all that.

People deposited their gold and silver in banks for safekeeping, then used the paper claims to the metal as convenient substitutes for money.  Bankers soon proved they couldn’t be trusted.  They would give in to the temptation to loan out some of their deposits at interest, having observed that most people were satisfied using the paper itself in their transactions and would rarely redeem it for the gold or silver. 

When noteholders and depositors came running to redeem their rightful claims and the banks proved unable to comply, the government allowed the banks to turn them away empty-handed while remaining in business.  

Slamming the doors on legitimate note holders and depositors was embarrassing to the banks, not to mention unprofitable.  Thus in the U.S. the biggest bankers pushed for and finally got a law passed in 1913 that created a central bank - the Federal Reserve.  Economist Joe Salerno describes the Fed as
a cartelizing device that limits entry into and regulates competition within the lucrative fractional-reserve banking industry and stands ready to bail it out, thus guaranteeing its profits and socializing its losses.  p. xxi
For a few years there was a serious problem with this arrangement: gold stood in the way.  Central banks could conceivably counterfeit gold but the fake coins would differ in composition from the real thing and would be subject to detection.  From the counterfeiters’ perspective, the beauty of paper money is that it all looked the same.

Gold was subsequently framed as one of the causes of the Great Depression and by decree paper, the money substitute, became money itself.  The president the people elected seized their gold and locked it up in the Fort Knox Bullion Depository.  As dollars can now be created with a few keystrokes, it has proven trivial to fund trillion dollar deficits and endless rounds of QE.

Today, the rich are getting richer and the poor are getting poorer not because of “capitalism,” but because of a government-supported monetary system that enriches designated counterfeiters and their beneficiaries at the expense of other dollar holders.

Ironically, Milton Friedman, never a champion of a gold coin standard, had priceless insight to how it worked:
If a domestic money consists of a commodity, a pure gold standard or cowrie bead standard, the principles of monetary policy are very simple. There aren’t any. The commodity money takes care of itself. p. 366
Given that monetary policy today consists of varying degrees of counterfeiting, we need to get government out of the way and let the market-designated money - whatever it may be - take care of itself.

Friday, January 11, 2013

Lessons not learned from World War II

Policymakers today draw what they consider obvious conclusions from the Good War.   The New Deal had been chipping away at unemployment and the economy was recovering, but then Japan’s surprise attack provided the political means for allowing the government to shift gears.  Over the next four years the American economy got a heavy dose of Keynesianism, and the results prove the Keynesian case: GDP soared and unemployment all but disappeared.  Only in 1946 did official GDP take a beating, though surprisingly, given that the government fired roughly 20% of the labor force, the unemployment rate rose to only 3.8%.  (Five percent is considered normal for a healthy economy.)

Since Keynesianism has been validated under fire in the real world, its advocates tell us, it is altogether appropriate that government spend and inflate the economy back to prosperity today or any other time.

This is why Obama in 2009 came charging into office touting a big spending plan.  Mark Zandi, one of the architects of Obama’s stimulus package (officially, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Plan of 2009), projected in November, 2008 that “even with the [$300 billion] stimulus [in 2009], some 1.8 million jobs will be lost, with unemployment peaking near 8%.”  Without the stimulus, God forbid, unemployment would reach 8.94% by October, 2009.

What actually happened?  By October, 2009, with a $250 billion stimulus (according to the CBO), unemployment reached 10.1%.  How did it happen that the cure made matters worse by more than a full point?  Always spin-ready, the administration’s post-facto claim was they had misjudged the degree to which Bush had ruined the economy.  Without the stimulus, you see, unemployment would’ve risen even further. 

They can say this with a straight face because they know big deficits and inflation did the trick in World War II.  They know because they’ve seen the data.  Even conservatives readily agree - “World War II got us out of the Depression.”

Conscription to the rescue

During the 1930s and up until Pearl Harbor, there were many deteriorating measures of economic health, but none worse than unemployment.  All the controls and regulations, all the taxes and inflation, all the fireside chats and damnations of the rich, all the privileges to the unions, all the deficits, were not restoring employment to anything close to pre-Crash levels.

Then the Japanese finally struck, giving Roosevelt the back door he had been looking for. 

Finally, the government was in a position to provide millions of men with a paying job - conscript them and send them overseas to fight a war.  Government’s pitch was we had tried minding our own business but the forces of evil spread to our shores - not our shores, exactly, but the shores of an island some 2,500 miles from the mainland where the U.S. Navy had been hanging out since the 19th century.

There was a sudden rush to kill a lot of people, and the government would pay men to do the killing.  Low pay, of course, but nonetheless something.  Since government was doing the “hiring,” the 10 million or so men who were drafted could either take the job or stay home in the comfort of prison.  In a display of patriotic fervor, most of them took the job.  The draftees had no way of knowing their beloved FDR had set them up by provoking an attack that killed over 2,400 people, including civilians.

Was the economy booming as a result of the war?  No.  People stateside were working, but they were building things for the military rather than private citizens.  People were getting paychecks but price ceilings, rationing, and other government controls made life anything but prosperous.

Let’s ask that question again: Was the economy booming?  Absolutely.  The GDP figures tell the story.  During the war years, GDP exploded.  The government component of GDP went wild while private investment shrank, but so what?  To most analysts, GDP is GDP.

Ignoring the market’s signals

From the beginning of the depression in 1930, the free market had been willing to put people to work, but government wouldn’t let it.  Allowing wages to fall along with other prices was deemed cruel and unfair.  Almost 12 years later wages did fall for the men sent overseas, over a million of whom came back dead or wounded.   

Americans had a choice - the market’s way or the government’s way.  Unfortunately, they let government decide for them.

Politicians know that workers don’t take kindly to seeing their nominal income decrease, even if other prices are falling, and are likely to register their displeasure at the polls.  But there has to be more to it than political expediency, so officials announce that if wages fall, workers can’t buy as much and the economy goes downhill.   So they keep wages up to protect the workers, without whose spending they put themselves out of a job.

Keeping wages from falling did protect them - the ones who managed to hold onto their jobs.  Given the falling prices prior to Roosevelt’s gold heist, people with jobs found the dollars in their paychecks were buying more.  Predictably, high wages led to high unemployment, but Keynes considered this evidence of market failure, that Say’s Law no longer worked - there was a glut of labor but no one was hiring.  As Rothbard explains, however,
There is never any genuine unsold surplus, or "glut," whether specific or general over the whole economy, if prices are free to fall to clear the market and eliminate the surplus.
Keynes’s recommended policy - deficit spending and inflation - was far more politically palatable than leaving wage rates to the market.  With above-market wages, especially after passage of the Wagner Act in 1935, not only were people out of work, but those with jobs frequently worked reduced work weeks and lived in constant fear of getting fired.  By contrast, if you were stateside during the war you had no trouble at all finding a military contractor willing to hire you.

Government deficits and inflation didn’t cure unemployment in the 1930s, and they didn’t cure it during the war, either.  

When did prosperity return?  After Roosevelt died and the war ended, a new attitude prevailed in Washington that gave investors enough confidence to begin investing again.  Most of the wartime controls were removed, and consequently private investment soared even though official GDP plummeted.

As Robert Higgs tells us,
A minimum estimate of [economic] growth in 1946 was 30%.  There was never a year like that in our history.  Ever.  Not even half that good.  Ever.  Thirty percent in one year.  This was real growth. 

What looks like the second-worse year in history from the standard GDP data was, in reality, the best year ever in year to year performance of all time.  This was the real peace dividend.
Conclusion

Keynesianism instills the conviction that some combination of deficits and inflation will set things right again, that when one QE or stimulus package doesn’t do the job, another will, then another, then another.  We need to remember that it wasn’t more government that restored prosperity in 1946, but rather the release of productive energy made possible by significantly less government.

Monday, December 31, 2012

The Economic Superbowl: 1920-1921 versus 1930-1931

It’s been said there’s no such thing as a controlled experiment in the social sciences, including economics.  But we had something close to a laboratory experiment back in 1920-1921 and 1930-1931.*

In each of these periods there was a depression.  Unemployment was high - for awhile, it was higher in the 1920s than in the 1930s.  Prices were falling in both periods. 

In the 1920-21 depression, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York crashed the monetary base, thereby reducing the money stock, and jacked interest rates to record highs.

In the 1930-1931 depression, the federal reserve gradually increased the monetary base and lowered the interest rate. 

In the 1920-21 period the government slashed spending and allowed nominal wages to fall.

In the 1930-31 depression the government increased spending and deficits while pressuring industrial leaders to maintain wage rates.

Tax Policies

Coming out of World War I the highest marginal income tax rate was 77%.  First Harding, then Coolidge (following Treasury secretary Andrew Mellon’s advice) lowered tax rates steadily in the early 1920s.  By 1925 the highest tax rate was around 25%.  Tax receipts began to climb, as people stopped playing defense and looked for ways to grow their income.  As incomes increased, so did tax revenue in spite of the lower rates. 

In 1932, Hoover pushed through one of the highest peacetime tax increases in U.S. history.  A person making above a million dollars in 1931 could keep 75 cents on the dollar; a year later the amount plunged to 37 cents on the dollar.  In the lowest bracket, rates more than doubled.  Along with this were countless taxes on items that had never been taxed.  From 1931 - 1933, revenue from the individual income tax dropped by more than half.  By 1933, the economy was at the depth of the Depression.

Roosevelt went further.  The top income tax rate had spiked from 24 to 63 percent under Hoover, and then to 78 percent in 1935 under FDR.  Capital gains taxes more than doubled, going from 12.5 percent during the 1920s and early 1930s to 32 percent by 1934-1935.  In 1936, the New Dealers decided to tax corporate savings, imposing a severe penalty on businesses that depended on profits to expand operations.  Called the Undistributed Profits Tax, it entrenched the bigger firms by keeping their smaller competitors from expanding.  It also pressured firms to use debt instead of equity to finance expansion.

Throughout the 1920s, the Coolidge administration ran a budget surplus every year.  Throughout the 1930s, first Hoover, then Roosevelt ran budget deficits every year.

Keynesians such as Christina Romer tell us Hoover tried to balance the budget, and then FDR ran deficits but they weren’t big enough.  It took the huge deficits of World War II to break the back of the Depression.  Whether fighting the war overseas or on the home front, Americans were anything but prosperous during this period.

Monetarists such as Milton Friedman tell us the Fed didn’t inflate enough after the Crash to offset the fall in the money supply.   People were pulling their money out of the banks, and the Fed failed to offset the deflationary effect this was creating. 

During previous crises in the 19th and early 20th centuries the Fed was subject to the same criticism.  The Fed really didn’t inflate enough before it existed, as economist Robert Murphy puts it.  Yet we recovered from those crises in two years, on average.

Gold takes the blame


Both Keynesians and monetarists blame the gold standard for restricting policy options.  When FDR confiscated the people’s gold in 1933 and outlawed contracts denominated in gold, the Fed went on a printing spree and the government stepped up its spending.  From 1933-1936, unemployment declined steadily while GDP increased.

But the gold standard in some form had existed for centuries prior to the the 1930s.  Why did it suddenly cause a massive depression?  It existed during the depression of 1920-21, yet that crisis was over in two years and was followed by one of the most prosperous periods in U.S. history.

And if the gold standard of 1929 did cause the depression, why didn’t going off gold end it?  Fed monetary inflation and government spending improved the statistics somewhat but the economy remained in a depressed state throughout the 1930s and beyond. 

Critics of gold rarely mention that the gold standard that failed was not the classical gold standard of the 19th century.  European governments ordered their banks to stop redeeming gold in 1914 so they could use the printing press to pay for the Great War.  The “gold standard” abandoned in the 1930s had been erected in 1922 at a conference attended by 34 countries in Genoa, Italy.  Called the gold exchange standard, its purpose was to keep gold “in the vaults” by redeeming currencies not in coins but in large bars.  Most European citizens were thereby disarmed of their means for keeping government spending under control.  U.S. citizens could still legally redeem bank notes for gold coins, but in practice it was rare. The gold exchange standard collapsed in 1931 when England went off gold completely because it couldn’t redeem France’s sterling holdings.

The monetarists’ slam-dunk: The double-dip of 1937-1938


According to monetarists, the Fed interrupted the New Deal’s recovery in 1936-1937 when it doubled the reserve requirements of its member banks, thus contracting the money stock and producing a double-dip or a “depression within a depression” in 1937-1938.  Unemployment spiked and GDP fell off.   

Let’s take a closer look at this period and the years preceding it.  Following passage of the Gold Reserve Act of 1934, the U.S. Treasury was under a legal mandate to purchase all the gold offered to it at the rate of $35 an ounce, a 69 percent increase over the classical rate of $20.67.  The Treasury was in effect mimicking the Fed’s inflationary open market operations by freely purchasing demonetized gold instead of government securities.  Gold flowed into the U.S. from abroad, increasing bank reserves and inflating the money supply by over 10% annually from 1934-1936.

When in 1937 the Treasury began sterilizing their purchases (i.e., selling securities to pay for the gold instead of printing money) it slowed the growth of the money supply.  Doubling the reserve requirements brought interest rates up a notch but they were still very low.  Cheap loans were still available for businesses that wanted them. 

So what caused the plunging economic indicators?

As economist Joseph Salerno points out, money wages shot up 13.7% in the first three quarters of 1937.  The Supreme Court had recently upheld the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, and unions were cashing in.  With labor productivity remaining constant, unemployment began to rise. 
As business profits were squeezed by the run-up of labor costs and the economy slipped into recession, banks prudently began to contract their loans and pile up liquid reserves to protect themselves against prospective loan defaults and bank runs. To offset this uncontrolled decline of the money supply, beginning in mid-1938 the Fed (and the Treasury) once again resorted to an inflationary policy, reversing the reserve requirement increase and allowing gold inflows to once again pump up bank reserves.
Between June 30, 1937 and June 30, 1938 the money supply did in fact decrease, but this was a result, rather than a cause, of the recession, Salerno concludes.

And the winner?

Experts from the leading schools of economics today - the Keynesian and monetarist - tell us the Great Depression could’ve been avoided.  They know the depression of 1920-21 was followed by the Roaring Twenties.  They know the depression of 1930-31 turned into the Great Depression and is one of the reasons the world went to war in the 1940s.  So, do these experts take the government/Fed response to the 1920-21 depression as their model?

Perhaps because it would put them out of work, their answer is a resounding No.

That these same experts never see a crisis on the horizon should not dissuade us from trusting them.

* I strongly recommend a careful reading of Robert P. Murphy’s The Politically Incorrect Guide to the Great Depression and the New Deal.

Friday, November 2, 2012

Who Are the Revolutionaries in a Free Market Revolution?

On the dedication page of Ron Paul’s The Revolution: A Manifesto we find these words:
To my supporters:
I have never been more humbled and honored than by your selfless devotion to freedom and the Constitution.
The modifier “selfless” is intended as a moral tribute.  Imagine instead if he had written “selfish.”  Would that kill the Paul freedom movement?  Certainly there would be many who would question his choice of words, though most would probably shrug it off as an unfortunate typo. 

But if he had written “selfish” quite intentionally, how many people would regard that as a moral tribute?

What are the facts?  Can we really say that people who fight for freedom are acting in self-denial?  Wouldn’t freedom be an infinitely better condition to live under than the controlled society we now have or the totalitarian slave state we’re edging towards?  And if this is true, wouldn’t it be correct to say Paul’s supporters act in their conscientious self-interest, and therefore their support should be considered selfish?

So why didn’t he use that word?

As authors Yaron Brook and Don Watkins argue in their stimulating book, Free Market Revolution: How Ayn Rand’s Ideas Can End Big Government, it is the widespread inability to affirm the self that accounts for the continuing decline of freedom.  And since political freedom implies economic freedom, traditional selfless morality becomes capitalism’s greatest enemy, as they discuss in detail.

The Triumph of Greed?

When the financial crisis arrived in 2007-2008, capitalism’s enemies had no trouble spotting who they believed were the culprits: greedy businessmen and speculators.  Once again, the government had trusted them with freedom, and once again their insatiable greed brought the economy to its knees.  But Brook and Watkins point out what should be obvious, that freedom in economic affairs had been increasingly restricted for decades:
[B]ecause the conventional view of selfishness remained entrenched, it was not the “public servants” in Washington who took the blame . . . .

The true lesson of the financial crisis is exactly the opposite of what the pundits concluded.  The conventional view is that the free market failed.  In fact, it was the unfree market that failed, and it is more freedom that is the solution. [p. 58]
As they tell us later in discussing soaring health care costs,
It’s no accident that we don’t have a computer crisis, or a hair salon crisis, or a veterinary crisis.  Nor is it an accident that we did have a housing and financial crisis.  Along with housing and finance, medicine is one of the most regulated industries in the United States . . . [p. 194; emphasis added]
But wait - Bernie Madoff was selfish, was he not?  He was trusted and left free to gain as much money as he could, which for him meant cheating his clients through a fantastic Ponzi scheme.  Could it not be argued that the combination of freedom and selfishness cost his clients billions?  One of his clients, a French aristocrat named Rene-Thierry Magon de la Villehuchet, was so heavily invested he was found dead of an apparent suicide after Madofff was arrested for fraud.  Ask almost anyone to name an example of a selfish person and Madoff becomes a prime candidate.  “To be selfish is to be like Madoff,” the authors write, “to screw anyone, even family and friends, in order to get more, more, more for me, me, me.  Madoff is just the latest poster boy for the evil of selfishness.” [p. 63]

But there’s a problem with this portrayal of selfishness - it includes people who don’t swindle others to get ahead.  It includes people who make a lot of money by producing goods that others value.  It includes people like Steve Jobs, “who was routinely derided as selfish” and was condemned for focusing on profit rather than philanthropy.  A Wired magazine commentary in 2006 described him as “nothing more than a greedy capitalist who’s amassed an obscene fortune.  It’s shameful,” adding that “he skates away from the responsibilities that come with great wealth and power.”

Brook and Watkins reject this analysis:
Does it really make sense to equate producers like Jobs with criminals like Madoff - to accuse them of the same dark motive and the same moral crime (in spirit, if not in scale)?  One creates wealth; the other steals it.  One thrives by trading with other people; the other destroys the lives of everyone he touches.  One works incredibly hard to build a product or company he can be proud of; the other spends his time trying to cover up the fact that he has nothing to be proud of. [p. 65]
 Anyone who takes the time to look at how businesses actually succeed will find, in most cases,
not ruthless exploitation but mutually beneficial production and trade; an Apple economy, not a Madoff economy.  [p. 67]
This runs counter to the conventional notion of trade as a zero-sum (win/lose) game.  Yesterday I bought groceries at a local supermarket.  If trade is a zero-sum game, then one of us lost.  I came home with the groceries I wanted, and the supermarket had the money it wanted - a win/win exchange.  What we each gave up in trade, we gave up voluntarily.  I didn’t have to settle on that supermarket; I could have gone elsewhere.  No one forces the supermarket to stay in business; if it can’t make a profit, it will close.  Right now it’s mutually beneficial for me to shop there and for the store to stay open.  In this sense, each of us was pursuing his rational self-interest, what Ayn Rand defined as selfish.  The store doesn’t sell groceries under cost as a matter of charity, nor do I shop there to do it a favor.

Should the supermarket do more than offer goods I want at prices I can afford?  Should it be “skating” toward other goals that certain others regard as its “social responsibilities”?
To get them to swallow the idea that it’s their duty to serve and sacrifice, the altruistic push for corporate “social responsibility” has taught businessmen that their choice is either some monomaniacal focus on the “bottom line” - one that involves ignoring many of the factors that determine a company’s bottom line - or a mawkish pursuit of a “service” agenda. . .

Any company that achieves productive success [such as my local supermarket or Apple] should self-confidently reject calls to “give back.”  It created wealth - it has nothing to atone for.
As the authors conclude, “the path to profits is paved in principle,” not chicanery or crime - something the skaters of this world will likely never understand.

The morality of sacrifice vs. the morality of rights

The authors note that the “dictatorial mentality that seeks power over others does not preach selfishness but self-sacrifice.”  As a character in The Fountainhead pointed out, sacrifice implies that someone will be collecting the sacrificial offerings.  The morality of sacrifice, of exploiter and exploited, underlies Big Government.

Free Market Revolution offers many refreshing insights on long-standing issues.   Following Rand, for instance, it tells us that “a right is a moral principle defining and sanctioning a man’s freedom of action in a social context,” then by way of elaboration says, “A society of rights is one in which you are as free as you would be alone on an island.”

Think of Tom Hanks in Cast Away, the authors suggest - he had no “right” to a survival manual even though he needed one, no “right” to dental care, no “right” to matches for starting a fire.  His only right was the freedom to figure out all those things for himself.  The notion of “a hungry man is not free” didn’t go over well on the uninhabited island.  He either learned to catch crabs or starved.  He even had to solve the problem of companionship on his own, by drawing a face on a volleyball and engaging in "conversation."  Unfortunately for the purveyors of sacrifice, there was no one around that the Hanks character could serve, other than himself.  If he wanted to live, he had to be selfish, he had to make a profit, in the best sense of those words.

As the authors note, “a society of rights is one that removes coercion from human affairs.”  [p. 131] Modern “rights” are claims to certain outcomes, not freedom of action.  What makes modern rights possible is the state, which forces some people to provide for others.  “Rights” in the modern sense increase coercion rather than remove it.  The result is bigger, more expensive, more intrusive government.

What about the workers?

It’s frequently asserted that workers need protection from the ravenous clutches of big business and therefore beneficent coercion on government’s part is required.  Notwithstanding the moral implications of this claim, how does this square with the facts?  Brook and Watkins tell us that real wages doubled between 1860 and 1890, a period in which the population was exploding.  Not only were workers making more, they were working less, with the average annual hours worked dropping from 3,069 in 1870 to 2,632 by 1913.  Because we didn’t have a central bank inflating the money supply and thereby imposing an unseen tax on dollar holders, the cost of living was going down.  Gently falling prices were the norm. 

In this century, by contrast, real median household income has been stagnant since 1968, due to policy-induced inflation (cheaper dollars) and the cost of government (taxes).  And it takes twice as many people (husband and wife both working) to maintain that stagnation today. 

The Invisible Austrians

My one serious complaint with Free Market Revolution is the authors’ claim that
Perhaps the most notable defense of capitalism in recent years is Arthur Brooks’s The Battle, a book that has received endorsements and accolades from political heavyweights, from Paul Ryan to Newt Gingrich to Karl Rove. . . .

But for all its virtues, The Battle suffers from two major problems: It doesn’t actually advocate capitalism, and it cannot defend the pursuit of happiness.
First, the political heavyweights the authors name are neoconservatives, who are as far-removed from free markets as the political left.  It’s hardly surprising they would endorse a book that speaks in “vague generalities” about liberty and limited government, and that “never explains what capitalism is.” [p. 212]  No politician today became a heavyweight by supporting limited government, free markets, and sound money, though of course neocons are obliged to pay lip service to the foregoing to keep their conservative credentials.

More important than this, however, is the absence of any mention of the rise of the Austrian school of economics in recent years, especially since 2007.  What about Tom Woods’ books - Meltdown: A Free-Market Look at Why the Stock Market Collapsed, the Economy Tanked, and Government Bailouts Will Make Things Worse, The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History, Rollback: Repealing Big Government Before the Coming Fiscal Collapse, Nullification: How to Resist Federal Tyranny in the 21st Century - not to mention his Liberty Classroom, which purports to teach “real history and economics” while you’re driving your car?   We could add books by Thomas DiLorenzo (How Capitalism Saved America, Hamilton’s Curse), Robert Higgs (Delusions of Power, Against Leviathan: Government Power and a Free Society), Robert P. Murphy (Lessons for the Young Economist, The Politically Incorrect Guide to the Great Depression and the New Deal, The Politically Incorrect Guide to Capitalism), Peter Schiff (The Real Crash: America's Coming Bankruptcy---How to Save Yourself and Your Country, How an Economy Grows and Why It Crashes) and yours truly (The Flight of the Barbarous Relic, The Jolly Roger Dollar: An Introduction to Monetary Piracy) to the mix as well.  Why is there no mention of the proliferation of free market analysis at Mises.org or of the Mises Academy that offers on-line studies in economics, political economy, history, and even a course on Atlas Shrugged?  And of course Ron Paul, about whom the writers are silent, has become capitalism’s champion in recent years, especially among young people and political activists.  Could it be that mentioning the Austrians - especially Ron Paul - is forbidden because of their foreign policy of peace?

If so, perhaps the authors can explain in a revised edition how maintaining a military empire worldwide and invading countries without provocation are compatible with free markets and the nonaggression axiom.

George Ford Smith is the author of three books, available on Amazon.  Visit his website.


Thursday, October 25, 2012

A Review of Gary North's "What is Money?"

The inaugural installment of this collection of essays first appeared on LewRockwell.com on September 29, 2009 - fittingly, Ludwig von Mises' birthday. Dr. North is one of the foremost Austrian economists and economic historians working today, and has gained a wide following with his writing and lectures. These essays are virtually impossible to overrate; they clear up so much of what is misunderstood about money and banking.

Our civilization depends on sound money and honest banking. As North makes emphatically clear, we have neither.

A few excerpts should get my point across:

"The heart of the modern monetary system is fractional reserve banking. This system is based on fraud. At the very heart of the modern economy is fraud -- fraud on a gigantic scale. What is the nature of this fraud? Counterfeiting. Banks are government-licensed institutions that issue bogus IOUs. Because these IOUs function as money, they are counterfeit money. This is the heart, mind, and soul of all modern banking."

"Counterfeiting is universally condemned by civil governments. Wherever we go, a national civil government has passed a law imposing serious sanctions against anybody who would counterfeit the national monetary unit. Why do governments do this? Because they are all counterfeiters, and they deeply resent an invasion of their turf. Laws against counterfeiting in today's world are a form of gang warfare."

"To reform central banking is to perpetuate it. To perpetuate it is to accept the fundamental premise of modern economics: money is different. Money is not governed by the same laws of supply and demand that govern the rest of the economy. Money requires experts to administer it. Private contracts are not sufficient."

"Someday, perhaps, central banks will stop subsidizing their respective Treasury Departments. On that glorious day, governments will move rapidly toward bankruptcy, interest rates on government debt will rise, the markets will begin to crash, consumer prices will begin to fall, and the mother of all bank runs will begin. Get there early."

"The powers that be will cease to be powers if money dies. They have based their political control and their wealth on their control of digital money. This is the line to which the hook of state power is attached. To destroy the currency is to break this line. Better a new Great Depression than hyperinflation, if you are a central banker.

"If money dies, a lot more than money will die. This includes Bernanke's pension. He knows this."

I suppose one could be critical of the author for writing so informally about a subject that many would say cannot be translated into everyday language; that any attempt to translate it corrupts it and renders it misleading or just plain wrong.  But one of the hallmarks of Austrian School economics is the clarity of its expositors, a trait that seems to annoy the Keynesians who understand money only in the context of aggregates, equations, and central planning.  But if thought is to be a guide to individual action, then clarity of thought is indispensable, and North, in these essays, offers the reader a remarkable degree of lucidity.

There are other popular essays that delve into the nature of money.  Bastiat's What is Money? is instructive and entertaining, and Thomas Paine's attack on paper money lays bare what we've forgotten.
Having no real value in itself it depends for support upon accident, caprice, and party; and as it is the interest of some to depreciate and of others to raise its value, there is a continual invention going on that destroys the morals of the country.
Also highly recommended is Ron Paul's three-part lecture series, What is Money?

The sophisticated elites who run the monetary system proudly admit they don't know what money is, though they do concede that being unable to define money makes it difficult to manage. In a sense I can empathize with them.  Money - the commodity - was removed from the economy completely in 1971.  It is indeed hard to manage something that no longer exists, and if it did exist, would not require managing.  As Milton Friedman once wrote,
If a domestic money consists of a commodity, a pure gold standard or cowrie bead standard, the principles of monetary policy are very simple.  There aren't any.  The commodity money takes care of itself.  [p. 356]
North, borrowing from Mises, tells us what money is in six words, then proceeds to build on it.  Not very sophisticated, but infinitely usable.

Tuesday, October 9, 2012

Securing Property Rights in the Absence of a State

Many Rothbardians are vowing not to vote in this or any election since voting only supports the State.  But I wonder if they could be persuaded otherwise if they knew one of the ballot choices were to dissolve the governments and replace them with voluntary market institutions.  Of course, we don’t have that choice, and most people would either laugh or be scared to death if it were proposed.   But with sovereign nations riding the Keynesian sled into the Abyss, the dissolution might fall in our laps anyway.  Preposterous as it might sound, we might need to consider organizing society around something other than the coercive monopolies driving us to extinction.

Fortunately, we have both experience and theory to draw upon.  In this article I want to touch on two sources from each: The classic study by Terry L. Anderson and P. J. Hill, An American Experiment in Anarcho-Capitalism: The Not So Wild, Wild West and Robert P. Murphy’s Chaos Theory.

Thanks to Hollywood and popular literature, the American West [1830-1900] is often portrayed as violent and lawless.  As long as you had a fast gun and were willing to use it, you could get away with anything.  The reason: weak or nonexistent government.  In their literature search, though, Anderson and Hill found ample evidence to the contrary.  For example, W. Eugene Hollon, in his book Frontier Violence: Another Look found that “the Western frontier was a far more civilized, more peaceful, and safer place than American society is today [the early 1970s]."  Another researcher, Frank Prassel, writing in the mid-1930s, found that
if any conclusion can be drawn from recent crime statistics, it must be that this last frontier [the West] left no significant heritage of offenses against the person, relative to other sections of the country.
In the early West people protected their property and lives with private agencies.  Significantly, these agencies understood that violence was a costly method of resolving disputes and usually employed lower-cost methods of settlement such as arbitration and courts.  Nor was there a universal idea of justice common to these agencies.  People had different ideas of what rules they wished to live under and were willing to pay for.  Competition among the agencies provided a choice. 

Anderson and Hill looked at four institutions in the early West that approximated anarcho-capitalism (AnCap): land claims clubs, cattlemen’s associations, mining camps, and wagon trains.

Land Claims Clubs


Found throughout the Middle West, the land claims clubs or squatters’ associations showed how newly arriving pioneers joined together for common purposes without government assistance. 
Each claims association adopted its own constitution and by-laws, elected officers for the operation of the organization, established rules for adjudicating disputes, and established the procedure for the registration and protection of claims.
Though violence was an option to be used against those who didn’t follow the rules, at least one association used social ostracism to curtail or punish violators.  They formally resolved:
That we will not associate nor countenance those who do not respect the claims of settlers and further that we will neither neighbor with them . . . Trade barter deal with them in any way whatever.
Some claims associations were formed to oppose “speculators,” while others encouraged speculation, exemplifying how the clubs “developed rules consistent with the preferences, goals, and endowments of the participants.”

Cattlemen’s Associations and Mining Camps

Like the claims groups, cattlemen’s associations drew up formal rules governing their members, but their enforcement methods were often more violent.  As protection agencies, they hired gunfighters (stock detectives) to eliminate rustlers.  The mercenaries were not motivated by ethics, but by “the side which made them the first or best offer.”

Did the gunslingers ever form criminal associations of their own, selling protection and violating property rights as they wished?  There were a few loose associations of this kind, but they were “dealt with more quickly and more severely under private property protective associations than under government organization.”

The California gold rush of 1848 brought thousands of easterners west to seek their fortune, as did gold discoveries later in Colorado, Montana, and Idaho.  Many gold seekers organized before leaving home, and as with other private agencies the rules varied between organizations.  People had the choice of purchasing the set of rules they preferred.  Interestingly, many of the mining organizations prohibited lawyers from their districts and in one case specified no more than fifty nor less than twenty lashes for lawyers who were caught practicing law.

Anderson and Hill:
One early Californian writes, "We needed no law until the lawyers came," and another adds, "There were few crimes until the courts with their delays and technicalities took the place of miners' law.”
Miners courts provided a system of justice, and a judge and jury were selected from among the members.  Any law-abiding miner might serve as prosecutor or defender of the accused. 
In Colorado there is some evidence of competition among the courts for business, and hence, an added guarantee that justice prevailed.
Wagon Trains

Wagon trains rolling west in search of gold provide perhaps the best example of anarcho-capitalism in the American frontier.  Realizing they would be passing beyond the pale of the law, the pioneers “created their own law-making and law- enforcing machinery before they started.”  In many cases they created constitutions similar to the U.S. Constitution.  Once the travelers were beyond the jurisdiction of the federal government, they elected officers to enforce the rules laid out in the document. 
The constitutions also included eligibility for voting and decision rules for amendment, banishment of individuals from the group, and dissolution of the company. 
What made this arrangement work, according to the authors, was a profound respect for property rights.  Yet there was little mention of property rights in their constitutions.  The inviolability of property rights was so throughly ingrained that the pioneers rarely resorted to violence even when starvation was imminent.  Quoting John Phillip Reid from his study of the Overland Trail, the authors tell us:
While a few of those who were destitute may have employed tricks to obtain food, most begged, and those who were "too proud to beg" got along the best they could or employed someone to beg for them.
Certainly the transient nature of these rolling communities made them more adaptable to anarcho-capitalism.  The demand for “public goods” such as roads or schools never came up, for example, though they did have to protect themselves from Indian attacks without relying on the State.  For the most part, their arrangements worked.  People bought protection and justice, found competition among rules producers, and the result was an orderly society, unlike that generally associated with anarchy.

Murphy’s Case for Anarcho-Capitalism

In Chaos Theory, Robert P. Murphy sketches how market forces would operate to support the private production of justice and defense -- two areas that are traditionally conceded to be the sole province of the State.  Murphy contends that not only would the market be able to provide these services, but would do so much more efficiently and equitably than the system we have now.

Here, we’ll confine our discussion to a few key points he makes about the production of “justice” on the free market.

As with the western pioneers and the world today, no single set of laws or rules is needed to bind everyone.  People would enter into voluntary contracts that spell out the rules they agree to live by.   “All aspects of social intercourse would be ‘regulated’ by voluntary contracts.” 

Who makes the rules?  Private legal experts, who would draft laws under open competition with rivals.  The market deals with “justice” as it does with other services.  As Murphy notes,
“the market” is just shorthand for the totality of economic interactions of freely acting individuals. To allow the market to set legal rules really means that no one uses violence to impose his own vision on everyone else.
In an advanced AnCap society, insurance companies would play a major role.  People would buy policies, for example, to indemnify their victims if they were ever found guilty of a crime.  As they do now, insurance companies would employ experts to determine the risks of insuring a given individual.  If a person were considered too great a risk he might be turned down, and this would be information others would use in deciding if and how they wished to interact with him.

Critics say this might work for peaceful, rational people but what about incorrigible thieves and ax murderers?  How would market anarchy deal with them?

All Property is Privately Owned

Murphy reminds us that “wherever someone is standing in a purely libertarian society, he would be on somebody’s property.”  This allows for force to be used against criminals without violating their natural rights.  He cites the example of a person entering a movie theater, with an implicit contract such as the following:
If I am judged guilty of a crime by a reputable arbitration agency [perhaps listed in an Appendix], I release the theater owner from any liability should armed men come to remove me from his property.
In this way the use of force would have been authorized by the recipient himself beforehand.

But where do these armed men take the criminal?  On a free market, a high-security analog to jails would evolve.  These jails, though, would resemble hotels because they would be competing with each other for business, which in AnCap means both pleasing the criminal and guaranteeing his secure detention.  Unlike government prisons there would be no undue cruelty and virtually no chance of escape.  If a dangerous criminal escaped and killed again the insurance company would be held liable.  And a prisoner who didn’t like the way he was treated would have the option of switching to a different jail, as long as his insurance company was in agreement.

Would the Mafia Take Over?


People who support the State because they believe organized crime would take control of an AnCap society should consider that we’re already living  under the “most ‘organized’ criminal association in human history.”  Whatever crimes the Mafia has committed, they are nothing -- nothing -- compared to the wanton death and destruction states have perpetrated.   

We need to consider, too, that the mob gets its strength from the government, not the free market. 
All of the businesses traditionally associated with organized crime—gambling, prostitution, loan sharking, drug dealing—are prohibited or heavily regulated by the state. In market anarchy, true professionals would drive out such unscrupulous competitors.
Applying AnCap

Murphy discusses several applications of anarcho-capitalism in today’s world, one of which is medical licensing.  Almost everyone believes that without government regulation we would all be at the mercy of quacks.  “Ignorant consumers would go to whatever brain surgeon charged the lowest price, and would be butchered on the operating table.”  Therefore, we need the iron fist of government to restrict entry into the medical profession.

But this is pure fiction.  Since the demand for safe and effective medicine is universal, the market would respond accordingly with voluntary organizations that would allow only qualified doctors into their ranks.  Insurance companies, too, would only underwrite doctors who met their standards, since they would stand to lose millions in malpractice suits.

Regarding the ongoing controversy of gun control, Murphy sees legitimate points to both sides of the debate:
Certainly we cannot trust the government to protect us once it has disarmed us. But on the other hand, I feel a bit silly arguing that people should be able to stockpile atomic weapons in their basement.
How might AnCap resolve this?  Let’s say Joe Smith wants an insurance company to agree to pay $10 million to the estate of anyone Smith happens to kill.  “The company will be very interested to know whether Smith keeps sawed off shotguns—let alone atomic weapons—in his basement.”  In this way truly dangerous weapons would be restricted to those willing to pay the high premiums for owning them.

Though it’s hard to imagine any company willing to issue a policy to a holder of nuclear weapons, nevertheless, if someone wanted to, there would be no agency with the authority to prohibit owning them.  But without a policy, a person would be unable to guarantee his contracts with others and would find it virtually impossible to function in society.

Getting there from here

Establishing an AnCap society depends heavily on the history of the region.  North Korean market anarchists, for example, might have to use violence to curtail that brutal regime, while in the United States, “a gradual and orderly erosion of the State is a wonderful possibility.” 
The one thing all such revolutions would share is a commitment by the overwhelming majority to a total respect of property rights.
People already understand that rape and murder are crimes - even rapists and murderers.  The hard part is convincing people “that murder is wrong even when duly elected ‘representatives’ order it.”

We can build on intuitive notions of justice, just as newly arriving miners in California respected the claims of earlier settlers. 
To take a more modern example, even inner city toughs unthinkingly obey the “rules” in a pickup game of basketball, despite the lack of a referee.
As he explains in a footnote, the players in a pickup game still recognize the existence of a foul (and other rules), even if the offending player denies he committed one. 
Now, the market solution to such ambiguity and bias, for games deemed important enough to warrant the extra cost and hassle, is to appoint official referees to apply the “law” (which they too unthinkingly respect). Notice that at no point is a violent monopoly needed to achieve this orderly outcome. 
 Conclusion

Those who defend the State as necessary to protect  property rights should brush up on their history, from day one to the present.  As Murphy wraps up,

I ask that the reader resist the temptation to dismiss my ideas as “unworkable,” without first specifying in what sense the government legal system “works.”

George Ford Smith is the author of The Flight of the Barbarous Relic and two other books.  Robert P. Murphy is Libby Gadsen's scheduled guest for her radio show Gadsen Rising on Tuesday, October 16, 2012 from 4:30-6:00 P.M. ET.   His topic will be anarcho-capitalism.  Gadsen Rising is a www.FreedomizerRadio.com production.  Call 347-324-3704 to listen or participate.

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